K-IV vs. Indus Canals

A Nation at War With Its Own Water Needs

In the annals of Pakistan’s development failures, few projects are as telling, or as tragic, as the K-IV water supply project. Conceived as a lifeline for Karachi, K-IV has become a symbol of bureaucratic paralysis, political neglect, and technical mismanagement. Now, as it limps toward completion two decades late, it faces a new and far more existential threat: the federal government's aggressive push for upstream Indus River canal projects that could leave Karachi dry, permanently.

This is a clash of infrastructure. It is a battle of priorities, and one that starkly exposes how fractured, shortsighted, and self-defeating Pakistan’s water governance truly is.

The History of a Lifeline

K-IV was first proposed in the early 2000s to address Karachi’s escalating water crisis. With a growing population and over 85% of its supply coming from the Indus River, the city needed a dedicated pipeline to meet basic human and industrial needs. The project, envisioned in three phases, aimed to eventually deliver 650 million gallons per day (MGD) from Keenjhar Lake, fed by the Indus, to Karachi.

But from the outset, K-IV was mired in trouble. Cost overruns, design flaws, coordination failures between the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), the Sindh government, and the federal government brought progress to a near standstill. By 2018, the project had been deemed “technically unfeasible” by the National Engineering Services of Pakistan (NESPAK), resulting in another redesign.

WAPDA took over in 2020 with promises of fast-tracking it. Yet, five years later, it is still incomplete, with Phase I now tentatively expected by late 2025. Meanwhile, Karachi remains parched, held hostage by the water tanker mafia, crumbling distribution lines, and decades of neglect.

Indus Canal Project

As Karachi waits, the federal government, backed by the military under the Green Pakistan Initiative, has launched a series of new canal projects aimed at irrigating nearly 4.8 million acres of land, primarily in Punjab, Balochistan, and upper Sindh. The most controversial among them include the Cholistan canals, inaugurated with much fanfare in February 2025.

These projects draw from the same already-stressed Indus River system that Karachi, and K-IV, depend on. They are being greenlit without public environmental assessments, without consensus from the Council of Common Interests (CCI), and without the approval of all provinces as required under the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord.

In effect, while one part of the state struggles to finish a project meant to keep Pakistan’s largest city alive, another is fast-tracking parallel infrastructure that may cut off its water at the source.

Competing Interests

The absurdity of this contradiction cannot be overstated. K-IV and the Indus canal projects are not complementary. They are in direct competition for the same finite water resource. One is meant to keep 20 million people hydrated; the other, to expand agricultural frontiers in arid regions through political patronage and military muscle.

It raises a fundamental question: How can one country have two development agendas that actively undermine each other?

The answer lies in a state that lacks coherence. Pakistan’s water governance is fragmented across ministries, provinces, military institutions, and private interests, each operating in silos, often at cross purposes. There is no unified national water policy with enforcement teeth. There is no environmental court that can fast-track injunctions against destructive planning. And there is little will in Islamabad to recognize Karachi’s water emergency as a national emergency.

The Human Cost of Disunity

This disconnect comes at a devastating cost. Karachi’s residents face daily water shortages, with many relying on private tankers that charge 10 to 20 times what the state would. Industries suffer, fire emergencies go unanswered due to dry hydrants, and entire neighborhoods endure days without a single drop.

Meanwhile, new canal systems being laid for politically strategic gains in Punjab or upper Sindh could derail the very project that was meant to address these crises. What message does this send to Karachiites? That their survival is negotiable?

A Time to Choose

It is a fundamental failure of governance and justice. The state must decide: does it want to support projects that serve entrenched political and military interests? Or does it want to ensure access to water for its largest urban population, its industrial base, and its economic lifeblood?

K-IV must be completed, and protected. That means halting any upstream project that hasn’t been subjected to interprovincial consensus, scientific scrutiny, and constitutional process. The CCI must be activated immediately to assess water flows, prioritize needs, and issue a freeze on all non-consensual canal projects until Karachi’s supply is secured.

Otherwise, the canals being built will not carry water. They will carry the evidence of a country at war with its own people, and a government too divided to notice.